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-was an act in the. State. Ac-
-cording to the principle, each State
-could tax each share according to
the dividends pqid. Declaring a
-dividend is an act necessarily per-
formed within the State.
But to assert, as is often done,
-that one can be taxed in the
State of his domicile for every
kind of personal property for
which he holds a title, and that the
•situs of such property is the domi-
cile of the owner, is a fiction of law
for which we have no sympathy.
It enables each State of the Union
-to tax property all over the United
*States. It enables the States of the
east, where shares of corporations
.are largely held, to live off the west,
where the corporations are doing
business and owning property. .
It is an argument frequently made
by State attorneys-general in these
tax cases that if the decision is ad-
verse to the State her power of
*raising revenue will be hampered.
The fact seems to be totally lost
sight of, that a principle which en-
ables State A to reach out and tax
property or business carried on in
State B, also enables State B to tax
property and business in State A.
Infinitely better would it be to
establish a rule which would prac-
tically, as well as theoretically, con-
fiie each State to the property and
business within its own territorial
limits. W. D. L.
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Creditor's Policy-Insurable Interest-Recital of Debt in Policy.
A effected insurance upon his life with the defendant company, the
-policy containing a stipulation that the amount of the policy should be
payable to the insured if he survived the term named therein; or, if he
;should die within that term, then "to Michael Crotty, his creditor, if
living; if not, then to the said (A's) executors, administrators or assigns."
.A died within the term, and.Crotty brought suit against the company,
describing himself as a creditor of A, both at the time of the effecting of
the insurance and at the date of A's death. The debt was stated to be
"'for various sums of money, which this plaintiff had at various times
I Reported.
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advanced to the said (A), amounting to several tho "' dollar." .. Th6
answer denied that A was ever indebted to the plaintifi' and th oftly
proof adduced by the latter was the recital of the debt in the policy and
proofs of death. Held, that if the recital in the policy wasan admission
of the debt at all, it was an admission only as of the date of the policy.
The existence of the debt at the time of the death must be established by
affirmative testimony, both as to the fact and the amount.
Opinion by Mr. Justice BREWER.
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Insurance effected by the creditor a'description of interest which has
or'his otwn benefit. been held in several late cases to.
, While on principle it should be an insurable one, and not within
seem that a policy of insurance the prohibition of the Stat. 14,
eflected by the creditor upon the Geo III, C. 48, i. That inter-
debtor's life ought to be treated as est depended upon the life of Mr.
a pure contract of indemnity, yet Pitt, in respect of the means, and-
it appears to be well established by of the, probability; of payment
a multitude of decisions that such which the continuance of his life
is not its true nature. Lord ELLEzN- afforded to suh creditors, and the
BOROUGH, indeed, in Godsall v. probability of loss which resulted
Boldero, 9 East, 49, treated a de- from his death. The event, against
mand under a creditor's policy as which the indemnity was sought
being a demand for indemnity, bythis assurance, was substantially-
and expressly based his decision the expected consequence of his-
up6n Lord MANSFIELD'S opinion death as affecting the interest of-
in 'Hamilton v. Mendes, 2.Barr., these individuals assured in the
1210, which was a case involving a loss of their debt. This action is,
contract of marine insurance. But in point of law, founded upon
in spite of some recent vigorous a supposed damnification- of the
declarations that Lord Uir.4BOR- plaintiffs, occasioned by his death,
OUGH was right in this view, the existing and conitinuing to exist at.
weight of authority is decidedly tlke time of the action brought;
the other way. This will appear and, being so f6unded, it follows,
from an examination of the follow- of-course, that if, before the action-
ing djcisions was brought the damage, which
In Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, 49 was at first supposed likely to.
(i8o7), a creditor had, effected an result to the creditors" from- the-
insurance upon the life of Mr. Pitt. death of Mr. Pitt, were wholly ob-
Tha debtor having died insolvent, viated and prevented by the pay-
the debt was paid by his executors ment of his debt to them, the foun-
out of funds coming into their dation of any action on their part
hands aliunde. The creditor, who on the ground of such insurance-
had then been paid in full, was fails."
not permitted by Lord ELLuNnoR- The writer has been unable to-
ouGH to recover upon the policy, find any case prior to Godsal1 v.
Said his lordship: "The interest Boldero in which the nature of a-
which the plaintiffs had in the life. creditor's policy, as to whether it be
of Mr. Pitt was that of creditors; a contract of indemnity or not, is-
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discussed. And it will be observed
that even in Godsall v. Boldero
itself, Lord ]RLLENBOROUGH does
not explicitly make a distinction
between life insurance effected by
a creditor and life insurance in the
ordinary form.
In Dalby v. India and London
Life Assurance Co., 15 C. B., 365
(1854), the Court was compelled to
decide whether or not Godsall V.
Boldero would be followed. Dalby,
as trustee for the Anchor Life As-
surance Co., sued upon a policy of
£1ooo on the life of the Duke of
Cambridge. The Anchor Life As-
surance Co. had insured the Duke's
life in four separate policies, two
for iooo and two for £50o each,
granted by that company to one
Wright. In order to com-?1y with
a resolution of their directors lim-
iting insurances to 2ooo on one
life, they effect a p6licy with the
defendants for £ooo by way of re-
insurance. At the time the policy
was subscribed by the defendants,
the Anchor Company had an insur-
able interest to the full amount.
Afterward an arrangement -was
made between theoffice and Wright,
by which the former granted to
Wright and his wife an annuity in
cgnsideration of a sum of money
and the delivery of the four policies
for cancellation. This was done,
but one of the directors kept the
present policy on foot by the pay-
ment of the premiums until the
Duke's death. The question, there-
fore, was whether the interest of
the plaintiff, which had, terminated
before the Duke's death, was suffi-
cient to obviate the objection that
he was suing upon a wageriAg con-
tract. The Exchequer Chamber
were unanimous in holding that
the interest was sufficient.
Baron PARKE, in delivering the
opinion, pointed out that the con-
tract in suit would have been un-
questionably legal at common law
-whether the plaintiff had had an
interest therein or not, and he cited
Cozzens v. Nantes, 3 Taunt., 315,
and the earlier case of Lucena v.
Crauford, 2 B. & P., 324. "The
contract commonly called life assu-
rance," said the learned judge,
"when properly considered, is a
mere contract to pay a certain sum
of money on the death of a person
in consideration of the due pay-
ment of a certain annuity for his
life. The amount of the annuity
being calculated in the first instance
according to the probable duration
of the life, and when once fixed it
is constant and invariable .......
This species of insurance in no way
resembles a contract of indemnity."
Having thus explained the nature
of line insurance, and having shown
that the contract, even without in-
terest, would have been good at the
common law, he proceeded to con-
•strue the Statute 14 G., III c. 48, as
to insurances on lives, and came to
the conclusion that the require-
ments of the statute are satisfied
when an interest subsists at the
time of effecting the insurance. Of
Godsall v. Boldero he said: "Upon
considering this case it is certain
that Lord ELLENBOROUGH decided
it upon the assumption that a life
policy was in its nature a contract
of indemnity, as policies on marine
risks and against fire undoubtedly
are; and that the action was, in
point of law, founded on the sup-
posed damnification occasioned by
the death of the debtor existing at
the time of the action brought, and
his Lordship relied upon the deci-
sion of Lord MANSFIZLD in Hamil-
ton v. Mendes, 2 Burr, 1270, that
the plaintiff's demaiid was for an
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indemnity only. Lord MANSPiELP
-was speaking of a policy against
marine risks, which is in'its terms
a contract for indemnity only. But
that is not the nature of what is
termed an insurance for life; it
really is what it is on the face of it,
a contract to pay a certain sum in
the event of death; it is valid at
conmon law, and if it is made by
a person having an interest in the
duration of the life, is not prohib-
ited by the Statute 14 G., III C. 482'
This decision of Baron PARxE's
as followed in Law v. London In-
disputable Co., 24 L. J. Ch., 196;
I K. & J., 223. This was a case in
which the interest which subsisted
at the date of effecting the policy
had completely terminated at the
dateofthe death. The purclaser ofa
legacy which was contingent upon
the legatee's attaining a certain age,
insured the life of the legatee for a
terpi-which more than covered the
period of contingency. The lega-
tee attained the specified age, but
died within the period named in
the policy. The plaintiff was per-
mitted 'by Vice-Chancellor WOOD
t0 recover, on the authority of In-
surance Co. v. Dalby. "Goddall v.
. Boldero," said the Vice-Chancellor,
"was not a decision which met with
universal approbation, and the de-
cisio of the Exchequer Chamber
places the matter upon what, I con-
fess, appears to me, independent of
the high authority of that court of
appeal, to be'the light footing with
regard to polices of this descrip-
tion." The view taken in these
last two cases is violently assailed
by Mr. PORTER in his work on in-
surance (page 15), which contends
that Lord ELL-NBOROUGH'S judg-
ment was correct. He argues that
Dalby v. India and London -Life*
Assurance Co. is based (i) on amis-
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interpretation of the gambling act.
"In fire insurance," he says,
"which is under the same statute.,
a man must fhave interest at the-
time of insurance and of loss. But
in life insurance the words are con-
strued in a different sense alto-
gether. -But it would seem to be
clear that the same words in the
same statut are not capable of two.
contrary constructions." (2) On a.
confusion between a man's interest
in his own and another's life. (3)
On a mistaken view as to the na-
ture of a premium. "It is what a
man -will pay to protect himself
from a probably greater loss. A'
man has no insurable interest in
his premiums, and'by law cannot
insure them. , He his no more in- -
terest in .them than in his last year's.
butcher'sbill." (4) Ohaetitioprin-
cipii-inasmuch as both cases con--
sider that life insurance cannot'be
a contract of indemnity because the
sum is certain and all will be pay-
able; whereas the other point to be
decided is whether the whole insur-
ane should be payable at all
events, or only so much of it as.
compensates for the loss.
In opposition to PORTER'S view
MT. RICHARDS, in his valuable work
on insurance (page 38), says that.
Baron PARKE'S decision "unques-
tionably gives the sound and sensi-
ble rule. . . .' The rate of pre-
miums in life insurance is based
upon the supposition that the event.
upon which payment is to be made
to the insured-will certainly occur-
at some time or other, and if-a cred-
itor after paying premiums for a
long term of years was likely to.
lose all the benefit of his insurance,
it would practically prevent the-
uge of this important kind of secu-
rity." It maybe objected to RICH-
ARDS' statement that if the law de-
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dared that a creditor's policy was
a contract of indemnity the rate of
premiums would be modified so as
to meet the popular demand for
.security of this nature. This is,
doubtless, the answer that PORTER
-would make; but by way of rejoin-
der it may be remarked that the-
modification of the premium rate
would have to depend in each case
upon the value of the creditor's
chance of recovering his debt.
Such a contingency surely cannot
be recognized as a factor in insur-
ance. "The probabilities are not
capable of being estimated before-
hand with any approximation to
certainty." Moreover, it will be
observed that since Lord E -. N-
BOROUGH, in Godsall v. Boidero,
confessedly appealed to the pre-
existing law, his appeal must fail if
the law ai evidenced by the decided
cases does not suistain his view.
Upon this point Baron PARKE'S.
reasoning seems to be conclusive,
and since he found that life insur-
ance was not a contract of indem-
nity before the statute, the only
question for him to determine was
whether the statute changed its
nature. His decision was in effect
that the statute had deprived the
contract of life insurance of its
c.iaracter as a wager policy, but had
not transformed it into a contract
of indemnity. The fietitio prin-
czifi, and the mode of interpreta-
tion to which PoRT R objects do not
seem to be open to such criticism.
Baron PARuE drew his conception
of life insurance from the law as it
existed before the statute, and
merely kept before his mind the
old law, and the mischief in giving
effect to the statutory remedy.
PORTER contends that the courts
have shrunk from a consequence
of these two decisions, and points
to the case of Hebdon v. West, 3 B.
& S., 579, 32 L.J., Q. B., 85. In.
this case the plaintiff, a clerk in a
bank, was promised by a partner
therein that his salary should be in-
creased from 2oo to £r3oo per an-
num,, for seven years. The partner
also declared that as long as he
lived certain sums due by the plain-
tiff to the bank 4hould not be called
in. The plaintiff thereupon insure&
the partner's life for ,,Soo, and (his-
debt to the bank having increased)
he subsequently effected another-
insurance with another company
for £,25oo. The partner died, and
the plaintiff having collected the
first policy paid the amount of it to-
the bank. In a suit upon the sec-
ond policy it was held thatthe niiere
promise to forbear did not give the
plaintiff an interest, but that the
promise to employ raised an inter-
est which would have been suffi-
cient to support the second policy.
The voluntary payment, however,
of the C5ooo under the first policy,
since it more than covered the
amount of the entire interest, was.
held to be a bar to recovery upon
the second. It will be observed
that this was not a question of the-
cessation of interest; here the plain-
tiff's whole interest was exhausted
by the first insurance, and evidence-
to that effect was before the Court.
The plan suggested by PORTER, of'
objecting to this evidence, was not
attempted by counsel.
The Supreme Court of the United
States has adopted the view of the-
law taken in Dalby v. The Insur-
ance Company.
In the Connecticut Mutual Life-
Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S.,
457, an insurance was effected upon
the joint lives of husband and wife,,
payable to the survivor on the death
of either. The insured was divorced.
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.a vinculo matrimonii.. The woman
thereafter was paid the premiums
to the time of the death of her for-
mer husband, and she was held to
be entitled to recover upon the pol-
icy. Mr. Justice BRADLEy, after
quoting from Dalby v. Life Insur-
ance Co. at length, uses this lan-
guage: "As thus interpreted, we
might almost regard the :English
s ftatute as declaratory of the orig-
inal common law, and as indicating
-the proper rule to be observed in
this country, where that law fur-
nishes the onlyrule of decision."
"In any case," he had observed in
an earlier portion of the opinion,
"it would be very difficult after the
policy had continued for any con-
!siderable time for the courts with-
-out the aid of legislation to attempt
-an adjustment of equities arising
- from a cessation of interest in the
-insured life. A right to receivethe
-equitable value of the policy would
probably come as near to a proper
adjustment as any that could be
devised, But if the parties them-
selves do not provide for the con-
tingency the courts cannot do it for
-tiem." It is thus seen that Mr.
justice BRADLEY quoted Baron
PARxv. with approval, and Mr. Jus-
tice BRADLZY'S approval of Baron
P:PxKB met in its turn with the.ap-
-probation of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
In Scott v. Dickson, xo8 Pa., 6,
Mr. Justice PAXSON, referring to
the Life Insurance Company v.
Schaefer, and to the rule in Dalby
-v. The Insurance Co., said: "It
requires but a moment's reflection
-to see that this rule is based upon
sound principles. It treats a con-
tract of life insurance not as a con-
tract of indemnity as in the case of
fire or matine insurance, but as a
-contract to pay a certain sum of
money in the event of death, and
if the policy fell with the cessation
of interest it would lead to this
result. A is a .creditor of B to the
extent of $iooo, and insures his life
to that amount. He continues the
policy until he paid in premiums,
say, $iioo. B then pays the debt.
If the policy ceasds as soon as the
debt is paid, A loses all he has paid,
and in reality is out of pocket $ioo,
although he has received his debt in
full." In this case Scott had been
the surety upon Dickson's official
bond, and (as far as can Ue-gathered
from the report) he continued to be
thus contingently liable until Dick-
son's death. The contingent liabil-
ity wai held by the court to give
Scott an insurable interest in Dick-
son's -ife, which was undoubtedly a
correct decision. But it is some-
what difficult to perceive how any.
question as to the termination of
the interest could under the facts
have arisen. In that.brafich o'f the
opinion from which the above
quotation was made, the Court de-
cided that there was a sufficient
interest to support an assignment
of the policy-supposing a valid
assignment to have been made.
The ultimate decision, however,
was that although the attempted
assignment by the insured to his
surety had not been completed by
delivery, yet thi evidence in the
case justified the couit in treating
the policy as if it had been origin-
ally effected by Dickson upon his
own life for the" benefit of Scott
-the latter b~eing treated as if he
had been the befieficiary designated
in the policy.
Insurance effected by the debtor
for the benefit of his creditor.
. The cases which have heretofore
been examined have been cases in
which (with the exception of Scott
468
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v. Dickson) the policies -were ef-
fected by the creditor, and in which
the premiums were paid by him.
An important distinction is to be
noted between cases of this class
and cases in which the debtor ob-
tains the insurance on the insurable
interest of the creditor-that is,
insures for the benefit of his credi-
tor-and pays the premiums him-
self. Says Chief Justice FuLIR,
in Washington Central Bank v.
Hume, 128 U. S., 195: "If the
creditor insures the life of his
debtor, he is thereby indemnified
against the loss of his debt by the
death of his debtor before payment;
yet if the creditor keeps up the
premiums and his debt is paid be-
fore the debtor's death, he may
still recover upon the contract
which was valid vhen made, and
which th6 insurance company. is
bound to pay accordingto its terms;
but if the debtor obtains the insur-
ance on the insurable interest of
the creditor, and pays the premiums
himself and the debt is extin-
guished and the insurance falls 'in,
then the proceeds would go to the
estate of the debtor: Knox v. Tur-
ner, L. R., 9 Eq., X55." To the
same effect is the language of Mr.
Justice BREWER in the principal
cage: "If a policy of insurance be
taken out by a debtor on his own
life naming a creditor as beneficiary
or with a subsequent assignment to
a creditor, the general doctrine is
that on payment of the debt the
creditor loses all interest therein
and the policy becomes one for the
benefit of the insured, and collect-
able by his executors or adminis-
trators."
It is said in 2 May on Insurance
(3 d edition), 459: "A creditor's
claim upon the proceeds of insur-
ance intended to secure the debt
should go no further than indem-
nity, and all beyond the debt
premiums and expenses should go
to the debtor and his representatives
or remain -with the company, ac-
cording as the insurance is upon
life or property."
Another case which discusses
what constitutes a creditor's inter-
est is the Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Luehs, io8 U. S.,
498. This was a case in which the
company issued a policy upon one
Dillenburg, who at that time was
in partneiship with the plaintiff,
Luchs, and who was desirous by.
means of the policy of securing
Luchs in respect of the advance
made by him of Dillenburg's share
of the capital. The court was
clearly of opinion that Luchs had
an insurable interest in the life of
Dillenburg-first, because at" the
time the policy was applied for
Dillenburg was still in default; and,
second, because Luchs was inter-
ested in having Dillenburg con-
tinue in the partnership. See also
Murrell v. The Company, io Cush.,
282; Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 4
Zab., 576; Bevin v. The Company,
23 Conn., 244.
The relation between the amount
of insurance and the amount of the
debt.
As to the amount of the creditor's
interest the case of Camm ack v.
Lewis, I5 Wallace, 643, is a leading
authority. In that case A, being
indebted to C in the sum of $70,
took out a policy of insurance for
$3ooo for seven years, B agreeing
to pay the premiums. A died in-
testate a few months after the
policy was issued, and B produced
A's note for $3ooo, dated on the
same day with the policy, but given
confessedly without consideration,
and also an assignient of the
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policy to him. It was held asto B
that.the policy being one of $306o
to secure a debt of $7o, was a sheer
wagering policy without any claim
but" 'considered As one meant to
tecure the debt. Said Mr. Justice
.MiLrR: "Under these circum-
stances we ,think that Cammack
could in equity and good conscienee
* only hold the policy as security for
what Lewis owed him when it was
assigned and such advances as he
'might afterward make on account
of it, and that the assignment of
the policy to him was 'only valid to
.Ihat extent."
In Warnock v. Davis, io4 U. S.,
775, it is said: "In cases where the
insurance is effected merely byway
of indemnity, as where a creditor
insures the life of his debtor for
the purpose of securing his debt,
the amount of-insurable interest is
the amount of the debt."
. The problem suggested in this
last quotation confronted the Court'
in Grant'sAdministrators v. Kline,
Iis"Pa,, i8. In that. case a poiic'
upon the life of Grant was taken
out by him and assigned' to Kline
to secure a debt-of$214, due bythe
former to the latter. The amount
of the policy was. $3ooo. It ap-
peared that other policies had been
taken out for Kline's benefit,.and
thathe had paicpremiums thereon
to the extent of several'hundred
dollars. They had, however, been
allowed to lapse, and "while the
.money thus fruitlessly paid on pre-
miums may-not have amounted to
an insurable interest in the life of
Grant, for the reason that sich pay-
ments do not make him a creditor
for their amount, we think they
showgood faith in.the transaction."
" This brings us," said Mr;Justice
PAxSONi'-"to the main questidn-
Was the amount of insurance so
disproprtioned to Kline's interest
in the life of Grant as to make this.
a wagering policy? We approach
this question, with caution; the
more so that this Court has not
laid down a rule upon this subject
That we shall be compelled some
day to do so is possible. We have
'said that the sum insured must not
be disproportioned to the interest
the holder of the p6licy has in the
life insured. To -take out a policy
of $5ooo to. secure, a debt of $5
would- be such a palpable wager
that no court would hesitate to de-
clare itsoas'amatter of law. Care
must'be taken alsaothat a debtshall
not be collusively .contracted for
the mere purpose of creating, an
insurable interest. 'Mr. Dickens ,
in his inimitable "Pickwick
Papers," -has shown/low & debt
may be created for the"purpose of
lodging the debtor in prison by
collusion with the creditor. Speak-
ing for myself, it may be that a
policy taken out by the creditor on
-the life of his debtor ought to be
limited to the amount of the debt
with interest, and the amount of
the premiums with interest thereon
during the expectancy of life, as
shown-by the Carlisle tables. This
view, however, has never yet been
addpted by this Court in any ad-
judicated case, nor do we feel com-
pelled to define.the disproportion
now in view of the particilar facts
of the case in hand. We do not
regard it'as -either immoral or
wagering for-'Kline to attempt to
secure the' sums hb had already.
fruitlessly. paid in premiums on
Grant's life, and-if Grant had no.
objection thereto, and assisted him
therein, I do not see that any one
couldobject to thid-but the con-
pany. Again; we have-the declara-
tion of Grant that he owed Kline a
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considerable sum of money, the
precise amount not stated; that
Kline had aided him in various
ways, and never refused him a
favor, etc. In view'of their con-
nection by marriage, and of their
admitted relations, it is, at least,
probable that Kline had aided him
at many times and in various ways
pecuniarilythat are not represented
by any evidences of debt. And if
the sum insured was regarded by
Grant as a reasonable amount to
indemnify Kline, with what grace
can Grant's administrators come in
and allege that it was not? They
have no possible equity; Grant
never paid one dollar of the pre-
mium, and if they are allowed now
to recover, it is not by virtue of any
equity, but by force of an inexora-
ble rule of public policy whicl
treats it as a wagering policy, and
declares the policy holder a trustee
for the person insured as to the en-
tire proceeds, save only the money
actually loaned, with the premiums
paid.
Assuming, then, that Kline might,
with Grant's consent, lawfully seek
to indemnify himself for the pre-
miums paid and lost, we have the
sum of $743.56 as the amount
which Kline was out of pocket.
We do not know what Grant's ex-
pectation of life was when the
policy was taken out, and there
is nothing before us upon which
we could base any reliable opinion.
But it appears he was 65 years of
age, and was an unusually good
risk. While we do not know what
the amount of the annual premium
was, we do know that it must have
been a considerable sum on $3000
for a man of 65 years, and with the
annual interest would roll up rap-
idly. That Grant died within the
year is not to the purpose; he
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might have lived long enough fox
the debt and premiums at com-
pound interest to have ekceeded
the amount of the policy. Surely,
in such case, we cannot say as a
matter of law that the dispropor-
tion was so great as to make it a
wagering policy.
In Cooper v. Shaeffer, 20 W. N.
C. (Pa.), 1;3 (1887), the same Court
held that the disproportion between
an insurance of $3o00 and a debt of
$io was so great as to require the
Court to say, as a matter of law,
that the transaction was a wager.
Here, however, there was no evi-
dence as to the expectancy of life,
nor does consideration seem to
have been paid to the age of the
insured, or to tle probable amount
of annual payments which the
creditor would be called uron to
make. Indeed, the Court have
since remarked that "Cooper v.
Shaeffer decided nothing but that
particular litigation :" PAXSON, C.
J., in Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa., 238
(i89i). In this last case, however,
the fule suggested in Grant v.
Kline (sutra) seems to have been
finally adopted. The policy was
for $3o0o to secure a debt which
originally amounted to $110.02.
Evidence was admitted to prove
that the debtor's expectation of
life was twenty-six years, and that
after about seventeen years the
creditor would have carried the
policy at a loss. Although the in-
surance was in a mutual company,
the trial Court found itself able to
estimate the probable amount of
assessment during the expectancy.
In deciding that the contract was
not a wager, the Court used the
following language: "In order to
ascertain whether an insurance is
disproportioned to the debt, re-
gard must be had to the age of the
